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Abstract
The Dissent and Its Change is a historical look at a few of the men who have had an
important impact on the United States Supreme Court. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is best known
for his many dissenting opinions while on the Supreme Court. He was one of the first Justices to give
the dissenting opinion legitimacy and to make it into a powerful force that can change the law.
Justice Holmes spent much of his thirty-year term on the Supreme Court dissenting against the use
ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate laws passed by state and federal legislatures. In the end,
Holmes' view and his dissent prevailed.
Beginning in 1941, Justice Harlan Fisk Stone served as ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court.
Once in this position, Stone made the Court a body that encouraged individual Justices to express
their opinions even when they were not the opinions of the majority. During Stone's five years as
ChiefJustice, the rate at which there was dissension more than doubled. Through the esteem placed
on the dissent by these and other Justices, it has continued to be used with astounding frequency. The
dissent has stood as an assurance that the Supreme Court remains a body open to disagreement All
ofthe men and women that serve in this powerful collegial court are insured the chance to let their
deference with the majority be known to all The dissent has been responsible for keeping the
Supreme Court in check and assuring that our Court is run by the Constitution and laws of the
country, not by the men and women that wear the black robes.
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Preface
I have always admired men and women that were willing to stand on the outside of popular
opinion. It is easy to make a stand against something when backed by throngs of supporters, but to
do it with the same zeal when one is alone is the mark of a special person. It is this sense of
admiration that led me to choose the dissenting opinion as the topic for my senior thesis.
I began the research with the goal ofidentifYing why it was that there were so many justices
expressing dissent on today's Supreme Court. First, I turned to the superb dissents of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Justice Holmes was always able to keep the dissent in check. He used it with the
utmost power but did not allow it to enter the personal realm. One of the most impressive qualities
that Holmes possessed was humility. Many of his dissents contained apologies, and he was never
afraid to admit his own short-comings. It was precisely this humility that made Justice Holmes
reluctant to pass judgement on laws properly passed by the legislature.
Throughout the project, I continually found myself proud of the work done on the Supreme
Court. It has always been fashionable to degrade the judiciary with cute lawyer jokes and intense
critiques of the decisions handed down by the High Court. What many individuals forget is that
through the words of men like Holmes, the Supreme Court has been the starting point of the
freedoms that are taken for granted today. Although the Bill of Rights states that these freedoms are
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guaranteed, it is the Court that has made sure no freedoms are taken away from the public. How
soon we forget that the Supreme Court and the lawyers of this country are the people who insure that
the United States remains a country ruled not by a dominating class, but by the people and by the
laws.
The dissenting opinion has always been the part ofthe judicial opinion that drew my attention.
It has been an edifying experience to read the words of the most prolific dissent writers our county
has ever known, More than anything, I take from this project a renewed sense of faith that the United
States Supreme Court is a body more than capable of keeping the law at the forefront of
development, I am just as certain that it is the dissenting opinion that makes this a reality.
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The Dissent and Its Change
In its earliest meaning, the term dissent was used when speaking of a person who challenged
the norms of religion. 1 In this sense of the word, the United States was founded by a group of
dissenters. These founders were known for their fight against oppression and praised for not
succumbing to the majority. From this historical standpoint, it is no wonder that legal dissent has
achieved such prominence in the courts of the nation.
Black' 5 Law Dictionary defines a dissent as denoting "the explicit disagreement of one or
more judges of a court with the decision passed by the majority upon a case before them."2 This
definition fully describes all of the technical aspects of a dissent but does not cover the freedom it
gives to judges. In appellate courts a panel composed offrom three to nine judges hears a given case.
There are nine Justices on the Supreme Court. When all nine do not agree on what the decision
should be and how it is to be reached, there is a dissent. Not every time when there is a non-
unanimous case decision does the Justice in the minority decide to write a dissenting opinion, but that
freedom is present. The dissent is an opportunity for the individual judge to express his or her
IJackson E. Percival, Dissent in the Supreme Court: A Chronology (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1969),3.
131ack's Law Dictionary, (1994), s.v. "dissent."
3
•
11
11
..
II
..
II
II
•II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
discontent with the majority. The very nature of appellate work forces the judges to decide upon
issues that others could not put to rest. By presenting judges with a proper forum to express
disagreement, the dissent serves an invaluable purpose. It allows for judges to explain their reasons
for disagreeing and propose a different outcome. The other critical function that the dissent serves
is that by giving everyone a voice, it insures that no opinions of the law are quieted for the sake of
presenting a court that appears united, Ifa Justice has a grievance with the majority, there is a proper
place to let that be known.
Former Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas thought so highly of dissents that he
wrote, "the right to dissent is the only thing that makes like tolerable for a judge of an appellate
court."] Although this feeling is not shared by all the men and women who have worn the black robe,
the ability to express onese1fis highly revered by all judges. Dissenting opinions are written to satisfy
no one except the judge who is drafting it. Even when all others disagree, the dissent can command
the kind of attention that enables the law to continually change with the society that it is designed to
serve.
"A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when the later decision may possibly correct the error into which the
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed."4 This is possibly the most eloquent
defense ofthe dissent that has ever been put on paper. Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles
3Antonin Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," Journal ofSupreme Court History (1994), 42.
4Charles Evan Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1966),68.
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Evans Hughes wrote this in his great treatise The Supreme Court of the United States. This came at
a time when Chief Justices were staunch defenders of the idea that a united voice should speak for
the Court. Justice Hughes rarely dissented and did not condone widespread use of such, yet he still
saw the inherent value of allowing judges to speak as they saw fit. His defense of the minority
opinion served as a reminder that in a country built on personal freedoms, no voice should be
silenced. As Hughes wrote, the dissenter is indeed trying to appeal to future litigants and judges. The
Justice writing the dissent often has no ability to change the decision of the present. The oral
arguments are over and every voice has had a chance to be heard. This is when a dissent is written.
By the time a dissent is put on paper and read by the other Justices, the vote has already been taken
and the decision made. The dissent gives the Justice a chance to be heard and a chance to make it
known that not all are in agreement with the decision rendered.
The dissent is at its best when it serves as an outlet for judges to express their discontent with
the decision handed down by their brethren. This is an important function for it insures that the
decision was not made in a perfunctory manner. S The public, above all else, expects the Supreme
Court and all other courts to decide on the cases before them in the fairest manner possible. When
a dissent is published, it is there for all the see that the decision was indeed satisfactorily argued. The
fact that intelligent people do not agree on all things has certainly never been a problem in most
arenas. The public expects for the diverse group of leaders in the Congress to disagree on many
subjects. In the judicial branch the expectation is only slightly different. When a majority is reached,
SHarian Fisk Stone, "Dissenting Opinions are Not Without Value," Journal of the
American Judicature 62 (Oct. 1942),78.
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the decision is made and the rule of law established. Stanley H. Fuld refuted the claim that dissents
take away from the power ofthe Court when he said, "I am positive that disagreement among judges
is as true to the character of democracy, and as vital, as freedom of speech itself,,6
There are still many that claim dissents cause the Court to lose power because they break up
the appearance ofunanimity and, in the process, certainty oflaw. The Court does depend on the grant
of power from the people to give it legitimacy. Although dissents do cause a degree of certainty
about the law to be lost, this is small price to pay for the good they serve. If all decisions were
reached and then the judges reported only the majority opinion, or if the losing judges acquiesced to
the decision of the majority, there would be no guarantees of a proper debate. During the first one-
hundred years of the Court, almost all decisions were reported as unanimous. The Justices wanted
to portray a united front to insure that the public respected all of the decisions of the Court. This
ideal of unanimity no longer serves as a deterrent to those that wish to write a separate opinion.
Today's Court has consistently had more opinions with dissents than it has opinions that were
unanimous.7
In this age of many dissents, the decisions that are reported as unanimous stand that much
taller. The most famous story ofunanimity serving the function of making a decision stronger is the
episode in which ChiefJustice Earl Warren fought hard to get a decision free from dissent in the 1953
case of Brown v. Board ofEducation. He achieved the impossible, and the case was reported as a
'Stanley H. Fuld, "The Voice of Dissent," Columbia Law Review, 62 (1962),926.
7Robert A. Carp and Ronald Stidham, Judicial Process in America (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 348.
6
•
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
II
II
II
II
•
•
unanimous decision. ChiefJustice Warren knew the value of a unanimous Court and was willing to
do whatever it took to have this crucial case reported to the American people with the full support
ofall the members on the Court. When this was achieved, he allowed the decision to be read to the
people. It is certain that if all cases were reported as unanimous the Brown y, Board ofEducation
decision would not have been so strong. ~
Many times a dissent is written not to win over a colleague or influence a court, but because
the individual judge cannot back dOm} from a deeply held principle. When time proves that the judge
was wise in his or her decision, it is a moment to celebrate the right to dissent. The Court is made
up ofmortals. These men and women are indeed very intelligent, but they still make mistakes. When
a horrendous decision has been handed down by the High Court, even a lone dissent can help
maintain the public's faith in the ability of the Court to interpret the laws of the land. One of the most
famous of these instances occurred. in the Plessy v. Ferguson case. In this 1896 decision, the Supreme
Court approved the principle of "separate but equal." Time proved this to be one of the most
notorious decisions ever written. Justice John Marshall Harlan v.rrote a very unpopular dissent that
has become the most memorable part of the case. At a time when the majority was making a mistake,
Harlan showed that not all of the members of the Court felt that this was the way the Constitution
should be interpreted. With the famous words "Our constitution is color-blind," Justice Harlan
managed to salvage a lost case and use it to suggest that the dissent is an invaluable tool. 9 Justice
Harlan's minority opinion was able to show that even when the Court made a wrong decision, the
RScalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," 35.
'Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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dissent could be ofimmeasurable value. The Plessy dissent was later adopted by the advocates in the
Brown case,
To place too much emphasis on the dissents that predict the future would be to deny the
reality that many dissents never become the law of the land. One of the most famous dissent writers,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, only achieved the ideal ofchanging the course ofthe law in about ten percent
onlis dissents. II) If most judges know that their dissent is not going to become the law, then why is
it that so many persist in dissenting? One reason is that Justices are used to being able to express
their opinions and as Justice Jackson stated, "It's more fun to write dissenting opinions."ll Although
this may seem like a careless thing for a Supreme Court Justice to say, it does make sense. The
dissenter is beholden to no one and is free to completely express him or herself as desired. A dissent
is written in the manner and style of the individual and does not have to meet the expectation of other
members of the Court, This freedom enables the Justice to express him or herself in a fashion that
cannot be achieved when '\-Vriting for the majority. For many Justices, the opportunity to show their
superior knowledge of the law is not easily passed upon.
Finally, the dissent is important as a test for the majority decision. The argument against the
rule of the present Court is right behind the majority decision for all to read. It is there for the bench
and bar to find and use for later arguments. This effect has received very mixed reviews. The critics
of the dissent assert that it opens the door for future litigation and gives the arguments to the
lOScalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," 37.
HAllan Barth, Prophets with Honor: Great Dissents and Great Dissenters on the Supreme
Court (New York: Random House, 1974), 5.
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attorneys for such litigation. There is little question that they are correct in this assessment. Those
on the opposite side of the debate reply that forcing the rule of the Court to stand up against counter
arguments insures that the decision is proper. The dissent is an ever-present litmus test that the
majority view must be able to pass again and again. 12
By forcing the rule of law to stand strong, the dissent has kept the law from becoming
stagnant and allowed for change to occur when necessary. The Courts of the United States are
criticized for various decisions from time to time, but as a whole the judicial branch has been able to
maintain the public's belief that it is upholding the Constitution. One of the major reasons for the
Court's success at staying in touch with society is the dissenting opinion. For many years, the dissent
was used sparingly and only in times of extreme disagreement. Beginning in 1902, however, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes brought a new degree oflegitimacy and force to the use of these opinions.
Holmes was able to make the dissent a voice of reason and not a voice of division. He had a large
influence upon the man who impacted the frequency of dissent usage more than any other person:
Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, who joined the court in 1925. The two men were together in the minority
on many occasions. Stone learned the value of the dissent from Holmes and never hesitated to
employ it. In 1941, Stone became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Soon after this, the
members of the Court turned to the dissent with astounding frequency. The trend had changed;
dissents have continued to be a strong force in the Supreme Court ever since. Today's Supreme
Court is one in which dissents are commonplace. Unanimous decisions are no longer the rule; they
are the exception.
12Stone, "Dissenting Opinions," 78.
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In the earliest days of the Court, there were no dissents because all Justices were given the
chance to express their views in important cases. The Court followed the English method of
delivering opinions seriatim. Under this method, in all important cases each of the Justices would
write an opinion of his or her own. This gave each person the chance to express their ideas, and
without a majority opinion there was nothing from which to dissent. 13 This practice may seem arcane
to us today, but it served the important function of allowing all of the voices to be heard.
The present Court tradition had its origins in the earty 1800's and the leadership of Chief
Justice John MarshalL Under Marshall's leadership, the practice of writing opinions seriatim was
abandoned. "Marshall firmly believed in maintaining Court unity. Marshall placed such a premium
on unity in part because of the role he was expected. to play on the Court. Until Marshall's
appointment in 1801, the Supreme Court and the judiciary had been the weakest of the three branches
ofgovernment. President Adams appointed Marshall to save the Constitution from the Jeffersonian
Republicans. "Marshall was a prominent Federalist who believed in a strong federal judiciary. In an
effort to strengthen the Supreme Court, Marshall did away with the old English practice. He felt that
the Court needed to be more authoritative and speak with a single, strong voice. Many times this
strong voice was his own. Marshall wrote and delivered nearly half of the one-thousand decisions
during his tenure. ChiefJustice Marshall helped mold the role of the Supreme Court, and for him this
was to speak with unity and without dissent. 14
13Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," 34.
14 Kermit L. Hall, James W. Ely, Jr., Joel Grossman, and William M. Wiecek, eds., The
Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),523-525.
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From the days ofMarshall until the end afthe Charles Evans Hughes era, the Supreme Court
remained an institution that embodied unanimity. The Justices many times accepted the majority view
even when it was not their O\VJl. 15 :Marshall showed this behavior in a case in which he had written
an opinion only to find that he was in the minority_ Instead of standing by his view, Marshall set an
example that he wished other Justices to fonow when they disagree with the majority. He spoke to
the Court saying, "I have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this first
opinion. I acquiesce to that afmy brethren."16 The precedents and norms of the Court were for the
Justice that disagreed to acquiesce to the view of the majority unless such action simply could not be
done in good conscience.17
This view prevailed during the early history of the Court, a Court which placed extreme
importance on presenting the law as clearly as possible. An explanation for such a practice must
consider both the norms of the Court and the men who were Chief Justices. 18 The standards of
writing took a shift toward more frequent dissents beginning in the year 1941
This shift in the manner that the Supreme Court writes its decisions has been the topic of
many debates and articles, There is no perfect answer as to why this occurred, but the high esteem
and almost reverence given to the dissents of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the early twentieth
15 Percival, Dissent in the Supreme Court, 24.
16Ibid,
17 Ibid.
18Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein, and William 1. Dixon, "On the Mysterious Demise of
Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court," Journal ofPolitics 50:2 (1988), 361-
364.
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century certainly have contributed to the high rate of dissents in the years following his success, His
dissents were commended for their style and foresight. The campaign that he waged against the
doctrines of substantive due process and laissez-faire constitutionalism was almost entirely a
campaign of dissents, In the end, Holmes and the dissent prevailed. It was not entirely the fault or
achievement of Holmes, but he played a large part in the fragmentation of the majority opinion.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on the eighth ofJ\.1arch in
1841. His father was a doctor who also had an interest in literature. This love of literature was
passed down to his son and proved to be one of the defining characteristics of the younger Holmes'
judicial writing. Holmes Jr. was educated at the Harvard Law School. This was important, for in
Holmes's day, law school was not a prerequisite to becoming a lawyer, He was greatly influenced
by many of the intellectual theories of the day, including a belief in the pre-Darwinian doctrine of
evolution. Holmes wrote extensively as a young attorney and formulated many of his life long-beliefs
during his early years in the legal world.
Throughout his career as a legal scholar and judge, Holmes became one of the leading voices
on the philosophy oflaw. Holmes wrote The Common Law in 1880. With the famous line "The life
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,"19 Holmes began a legal treatise that became
one of the most profound statements about the American legal system ever written. The book
attempted to peer into the law and find what it is based on and where it will go. Throughout Holmes'
career he showed an uncanny knack for predicting the future of the law. In The Common Law,
1901iver Wendell Holmes Jr" The Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Press, 1881),
quoted in The Essential Holmes, ed. Richard A. Posner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992),237.
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Holmes wrote, "In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been and what it tends to
become.,,20 Holmes showed his view of legal realism, a belief that the law changes with the
circumstances and indeed changes over time. Holmes' view was powerful because ofwhat it spoke
against. The book was 'Written at a time when the law was frequently regarded as an unchanging
SClence. The adherents to legal science believed that the law could be formulated into a set of
equations in which the judge simply inserts the facts. Holmes, on the other hand, saw the law as an
ever-changing order that took into account a nation's development. Speaking directly against the
legal-science approach, Holmes 'Wrote, "(The law) cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries ofa book ofmathematics."21 Justice Holmes saw the law as much more than
a rigid set of guidelines, It was instead a system which moved with society and allowed justice to
prevail. His work on the philosophy of law became a benchmark by which all other legal writings
were judged.
The Common Law provided one more important clue into the judicial make-up of Justice
Holmes. He believed that the history ofthe law was important as a predictor of the future, but he did
not see the past as the only criterion to which judges should look. The course ofthe law corresponds
with the changing nature of society. Holmes was not a strict adherent to stare decisis, the idea of
using past precedents to decide how future judges should rule. 22 He felt that the growth of the law
2°Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Press, 1881),
quoted in The Essential Holmes, ed. Richard A. Posner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992),237.
21Ibid,
2~lack's Law Dictionary, (1994), s.v. "stare decisis. "
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reaching consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains
the old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will
become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.,m For this reason, Holmes was able to
justifY his many dissents as part of the process of change that the law must go through. He believed
that, although he was in the minority at the time of the decisions, his view would eventually prevail,
Justice Holmes served on the Supreme Court bench during an era in which many ofthe finer
aspects of the Constitution were under great debate. He had a large role in shaping how future
generations were to look at the Constitution and how judges were to interpret it. During his thirty
years on the Court, Holmes witnessed the rise and fall of substantive due process. Adopted by many
of the members of the Court, substantive due process was the idea that the Constitution guaranteed
freedom from government interaction in contracts and in the lawful pursuit of life, Inherent in the
idea of substantive due process was laissez-faire constiutionalism. Many members of the Court saw
the Constitution as calling for the marketplace to be free from government control. The argument
was that if the government is allowed to control certain aspects of the market, then there would be
no way to stop the government from controlling the entire economy. Both substantive due process
and laissez-faire constitutionalism were used to invalidate many state laws that were designed to
establish a set of labor standards that would improve the plight of the worker. Holmes dissented
230liver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Press, 1881),
quoted in Kermit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, and Paul Finkelman, American Legal History;
Cases and Materials, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),348,
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against the rigid adherence to these doctrines on the grounds that the Court was not to decide on the
wisdom of the legislation; instead, it should leave the job oflegislating in the hands of the elected
members of the governrnent. 24
Holmes also helped bring about the beginning of the era in which personal liberties such as
free speech began to get a stronger foothold in the Constitution. Justice Holmes found himself in
dissent so often because of his belief in judicial restraint. He was a firm believer in the power of the
legislature both, state and federal, to enact laws that it felt the public demanded. So long as these
laws did not directly interfere with the federally protected rights that were stated in the Constitution,
Holmes believed the Court should refrain from judging these laws based on economic or moral
criteria. Many of his dissents were an effort to keep the Court from striking down laws properly
enacted by Congress or the states. In essence he used the dissent as a toot to further his view of the
separate roles of the legislature and the judiciary. As soon as the Justices on the Court started to
legislate from the bench or write economic theories into law, Holmes dissented,
Justice Holmes is remembered by his popular nickname, "The Great Dissenter." This
nickname was not due to the frequency with which he dissented but rather to the force and foresight
that were so characteristic ofhis dissents. It is not a surprise that Holmes is best remembered' for the
times when he stood against the majority. It was in the minority that Holmes was free to fully express
his beliefs and so eloquently challenge the path chosen by the majority. In several issues, Holmes'
dissents eventually became the blueprint for the majority opinion. For all the genius of Holmes' other
writing, it is his dissenting opinions that are most remembered. The dissent had a champion, and it
24Ha1I, ed., Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, 237, 240,
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was now a more powerful tool than ever in affecting the future of the law. 2s
In 1901, when Holmes first took his seat on the Supreme Court bench, the dissent was used
sparingly. The year before Holmes came to the Court, the dissent rate was less than ten percent. 26
The members of the Court put much more emphasis on solidarity than individual expression. The
main reason for this was that nearly all of the Chief Justices since Marshall placed a premium on
unanimity, For 100 years, the Justices of the Court had all been conditioned to avoid dissents at all
cost. The Supreme Court Chief Justice during Holmes' first eight years on the Court was Melville
Fuller. He was a strong leader of the Court and took a very active role in keeping solidarity among
the Justices. Fuller desired hannonious relations on the Court, and he achieved this because, "he was
blessed with conciliatory and diplomatic traits."21 Fuller was held in high regard by his fellow
Justices. Holmes had such adoration for Fuller that he described him saying, "He had the business
of the Court at his fingers' ends... Fuller was the greatest Chief Justice I have ever known.,,28 This
degree of respect helps explain why Holmes did not dissent a single times in his first two years on the
Court.
Holmes also believed that dissents, as a rule, were of little value. He never wanted to stand
in the way of progress. This aversion to dissent writing makes the fact that he became known as the
2Sln all of the following cases Justice Holmes' dissent was ultimately adopted by the
majority in a later decision: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S 525 (1923).
26Appendix, table 3-2.
21Walker, "Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms," 380,
28lbid.
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Great Dissenter all the more intriguing. Holmes had supreme confidence in the law and his ability to
see the path ofthe law. Holmes only dissented when the vision of the majority could not be accepted.
In 1904, Holmes wrote his first dissent. Holmes showed that he did not enjoy being the voice
that spoke out and expressed a different view. In a 5-4 decision that weighed the constitutionality
of an executive order to break: up the Northern Securities Company, Holmes dissented against
Theodore Roosevelt, who had placed him on the Court. The case was especially important for its
effect on the delicate role of federal regulation on commerce. The majority ruled that it was within
the federal executive power to break up a combination ofrailroads if they interfered with the free flow
ofcommerce. Holmes saw the action of the federal government as an infringement upon local control
of commerce. This beliefforced Holmes to read a dissent in open court for the first time. Speaking
of the limits that are placed on federal actions infringing upon states, Holmes began his dissenting
career with an apology: "I think it useless and undesirable as a rule to express dissent."29 This early
expression goes a long way in demonstrating how deeply Holmes felt about the issues from which
he was dissenting. For a man who did not wish to break: from the solidarity of the Court, however,
Holmes was soon faced with an issue that would allow him no other choice.
After 1905, the Court began to use the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate certain state laws. Many of these laws dealt with the issue of social experimentation and
other economic affairs. The due process clause was said to grant a "liberty of contract" that se1\!ed
the purpose ofkeeping state regulation out of labor negotiations and labor contracts. The Court was
placing into the Constitution a limitation that greatly restricted a state's ability to interfere with the
"Northern Securities v. US., 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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right of individuals to make contracts between themselves. The problem, as Holmes pointed out, was
that the employee and employer were not on level ground when it came to negotiating. The Court's
use of the Fourteenth Amendment to declare laws passed by state legislatures unconstitutional was
to Holmes a reason to speak out. Holmes opposed using the Fourteenth Amendment in this manner,
not because he was a great proponent of social legislation; rather, Holmes did not see that the Court
should strike down laws legitimately passed by the states just because it did not agree with them.
Many ofHolmes' dissents were written defending his view ofjudicial restraint. The Court's duty was
to decide upon the cases before them and to leave the job ofmaking laws for the legislature. His only
course of action was a direct appeal to future judges in the form of a dissent.
Holmes' first dissent against using the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate state laws came in the famous 1905 case of Lochner v. New York. 30 The New York
legislature had established a law limiting the number of hours per week a person could be required
to work in bakeries. The legislature made this rule to help return decency to the work force, as some
bakers were working nearly 100 hours a week. 31 There had been many reported cases of back
problems and ''white lung" disease, which is a respiratory condition related to inhaling excess
quantities oftloUf. At the first conference Holmes was with the majority in voting to uphold the New
Yark law. Justice Harlan wrote for the early majority, conceding that the New York legislature was
granted the power to enact legislation designed to protect the health of its citizens by the
"'Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
31Hall, ed., OxfOrd Companion to the Supreme Cou!1, 509.
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Constitution. Justice Rufus Peckham wrote a powerful dissent that caused a shift in the votes.
Peckham's dissent became the majority opinion.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Peckham overturned the law. His opinion stated that the
law interfered with the "liberty of contract" existing between the employer and employee. The state
law thus did not give either party the ability to freely negotiate a contract and deprived the worker
of making the most money possible. The opinion, most importantly, read the "liberty of contract"
doctrine into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. With the new constitutional backing,
the "liberty of contract" doctrine could more easily be used to overturn state laws that the majority
did not agree 'With. 32
Holmes began perhaps his most famous dissent with typical humility: "I regret sincerely that
I am unable to agree with the judgement in this case, and that] think it my duty to express my
dissent."3} Holmes felt the majority ofthe Court was placing in the Constitution a right which he did
not believe was there. The "liberty of contract" doctrine is never mentioned in the Constitution and
was being placed in the Fourteenth Amendment by the majority. Holmes, always the stalwart of
judicial self-restraint, raised his voice in opposition to the Court's striking down a law that was
legitimately enacted to right a wrong the legislature observed.
An important part of the substantive due process debate was the standard of reasonableness.
This standard asserted that if the regulation was a reasonable effort to correct the situation which it
aimed to correct, then the Court should uphold it. Unlike Holmes, many of the Justices found that
32Hall, ed., Oxford Companion to the Supreme Cou[\, 509-511.
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S 45 (1905).
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the legislation was not directed in a reasonable 'Way or interfered with the free market forces that kept
the economy working. This was OTIe issue that was never completely resolved and one which Holmes
and the majority continually differed 00.34 Holmes' view was that unless a rational person would
admit that the state action would infringe on fundamental rights, then the state law should be upheld. 35
In the Lochner dissent, Holmes established several themes that would become common
threads n.mnmg through all ofhis dissents against substantive due process. The first of these was that
judges are asked to decide matters based on the law and not on their opinions. Holmes recognized
that intelligent people are going to disagree with each other on the maximum number afhours per
week a person should work This alone should not influence how judges vote. Holmes best
expressed this by stating that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally different views."
He added that this alone "ought not to conclude our judgement upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States,"36
The second theme ofthe dissent was that the majority, in this case the state legislature, had
the right to put their opinions in the law, but the Supreme Court did not. Holmes had expressed long
ago in The Common Law that it was not thejudge's role to decide on the wisdom oflegislation. The
Court was to decide whether the legislature had the power to enact the regulations. Holmes wrote
in The Common Law that the legislature was where the law changes: "In substance the growth of
the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than what the courts declare to have been the law
34Hall, ed., Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, 238, 239.
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
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is in fact new. [The law] is legislative in its grounds,"31 This idea of the sovereignty of the legislature
to enact what it saw fit, became increasingly relevant as the Court shifted to a body more willing to
assert its power ofjudicial review on acts passed by the legislature. Members of the Supreme Court
were beginning to take a more active role in invalidating state laws on the grounds of
unconstitutionality. By taking such an action, Holmes feared the Court was reading its opinion into
the Constitution. This type ofbehavior by the Supreme Court was not part of the role Holmes was
comfortable playing. In the end, it was just such action that he wish to avoid. Holmes' dissents came
to be a voice against the Court becoming a "super legislature,"
One of the most oft-quoted lines afany judicial decision ever appeared in the Lochner dissent,
Hohnes wrote, «The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.,,3s
This was in reference to the current writing on the idea of Social Darwinism. Those that held to this
view were opposed to any governmental control of the economy, The believed that the market was
at its best when left completely alone. The losers in this philosophy were the masses that depended
upon meager wages from manual labor jobs. The current Court was begirming to adhere to this strict
policy oflittle government control. Holmes did not believe that it was the Court's role to judge the
case based on its view of the particular legislative policy, Lochner was the first time that Holmes
expressed this view, but it was certainly not the last.
370liver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Press, 1881),
quoted in Kennit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, and Paul Finkelman, American Legal History;
Cases and Materials, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),348.
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
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In the 1907 case ofAdair v. US, Holmes dissented again. The 1898 Erdman Act prohibited
employers from discriminating against union members. The act also prohibited the requirement of
employees signing "yellow dog" contracts to get employment. These were used by employers to keep
employees from joining labor unions. The "yellow dog" contract prevented a union member from
getting a job and, more importantly, made union membership grounds for dismissal. In an effort to
help the labor movement and improve the status of the worker, the federal government enacted laws
to prohibit these types of contracts. The majority saw the Erdman Act' 5 prohibition of these types
ofcontracts as an infringement on the freedom of the worker to freely negotiate a contract. Justice
Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that by prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts, Congress was
interfering with the personal freedom of workers to choose a contract under which to work. The
majority perceived that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of property rights and personal liberty were
being infringed upon by the Erdman Act. Their justification was that the Erdman Act was an
infringement upon the "liberty of contract. ,,39
The Holmes dissent had a familiar ring to it. He expressed his belief that the Court was
ignoring judicial restraint. It was usurping the right of the state legislature to govern in the best
interest of the majority. The dissent was particularly directed to this point. Holmes obseIVed, "I could
not pronounce it unwarranted if Congress should decided that to foster a strong union was for the
best interest, not only ofmen, but of.. the country at large."40 Holmes was adamant about the state's
right to enact legislation as they saw fit. His colleagues on the bench were continuing to read into
3'1Ia11, ed., Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court, 8.
"Adair v. United States, 208 US. 161 (1908)
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the Constitution things that Holmes felt were not there. He wrote, "I confess that I think the right
to make contract at will has been derived from the word liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments had been stretched to its extreme by the decisions. ,,41 Holmes was at his best when he
used poetic language to make points that would otherwise seem unimportant, but in statements like
this Holmes spoke to the matter as directly as possible. The main point was that the Court was using
an Amendment meant to help fanner slaves to invalidate legislation aimed at improving the plight of
the working man, To the pragmatist in Holmes, this was a travesty.
The 1915 case of Coppage v. Kansas42 also focused on the issue of "yellow dog" contracts
and union discrimmation. The only difference between this case and the Adair case was that the Court
was now striking down a state law instead ofa federal law. The majority struck down a Kansas law
prohibiting discrimination against union members. The importance of this case is that Holmes
continued to dissent. It was obvious that he was not immediately going to win the support of his
brethren, yet this did not deter him. In an earlier case, Holmes acquiesced after he saw that his
dissent was not going to change the majority opinion. 43 Holmes spoke of dissents in the FTC v.
Beechmont Hotel case, stating that persistent expressions of opinions that do not command the
agreement of the Court "breach obvious limits ofpropriety.,,44 In light of this and other statements
ofhis, the Coggage dissent was a reminder ofjust how deeply Holmes believed that his views and his
"Adairv. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
"Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
43Evan 3. Evans, "The Dissenting Opinion -- Its Use and Abuse -- Part II," New Jersey
Law Journal, 161 (July 1938), 3
"Federal Trade Commission v. Beechmont, 257 U.S. 441 446 (1922).
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dissents would someday prevail.
The next case in the ever-lengthening line ofHolmes' dissents against substantive due process
was in the 1918 case ofHarnmer v. Dagenhart.45 In this case the Supreme Court used the Commerce
Clause to strike down a law prohibiting child labor. Holmes saw this as the ultimate extreme of
laissez-faire constitutionalism. By adhering to a rule of invalidating state laws, the majority was
passing up an obvious opportunity to improve the living conditions of children. He expressed his
disbelief in the majority opinion saying, "It seems to me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce
its understanding by all the means at its command.,,46 This included state laws affecting labor.
Justice Holmes was growing increasingly weary of the Court's striking down laws that he
believed were properly enacted by the states. The language of his dissents was becoming stronger.
He was also aiming his dissents more at the majority opinion, and gone were the apologies for a
differing view. In the Hammer dissent, Holmes went right to the heart of the matter and appealed to
the Court, using the common-sense questions being asked by the public: "I should have thought if
we were going to introduce our own moral conceptions where in my opinion they do not belong, this
was preeminently a case for upholding the exercise ofall its powers by the United States ... 47
Not only was the language becoming stronger, but Holmes was also dissenting at a much
higher rate. During the first fifteen years of his Supreme Court career, Holmes dissented only 48
times. The second half of Justice Holmes' career began in 1917. During these second fifteen years
"Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
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Holmes dissented 130 times, 2.7 times more than during his earlier years. Holmes was no longer
willing to allow the voice of the majority to speak without disagreement. He had seen his dissents
have an effect and was now determined that if the dissent could change the law, then he would use
it to its fullest. It is also noteworthy to mention that Holmes began the second half of his career at
the ripe old age of seventy-five 48
At this point in the fight against substantive due process, Holmes had managed to win a few
minor victories. In 1908 Justice Holmes was able to join the majority in a case that dealt with the
state's ability to enact legislation aimed at correcting a social or economic condition. The case of
Mulier v. Oregon upheld a state law setting a maximum ten-hour work day for women. Justice David
J. Brewer spoke for the Court and acknowledged that "Long hours ofwork took a toll on women
and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being ofwomen becomes
an object ofpublic interest and care."49 The ruling was important both for what it did and for what
it failed to do. By directing the law only to \VOmen, the Court was not forced to reconsider Lochner.
Hohnes was beginning to bring the Court dOMl from its rigid stance against state enacted legislation.
There were now exceptions to the standard of "liberty of contract." It did not apply to women.
Exceptions such as this would prove to be an important element leading to the down-fall of "liberty
of contract." However, as the final paragraph noted, the Court was unwilling to completely break
from the doctrine at present. The final paragraph read in part: "without questioning in any respect
the decision in Lochner Y. New York, we are of the opinion that it cannot be adjudged that the act
48Evans, "The Dissenting Opinion,ll 245.
"Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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in question is in conflict with the Federal Constitution. 1150
Hohnes' next major victory came in the 1917 case ofBunting v. Oregon. 51 In this case, the
Court overruled the Lochner decision. Although the Court was badly split, they did approve an
Oregon law establishing a ten-hour work day. The Oregon law also required an employer to pay time
and a halffor overtime. The opinion read like the earlier Lochner dissent Justice McKenna indicated
that the Court did not have to acknowledge the wisdom of the Oregon legislation. The Court only
needed to recognize the legislature's authority to enact such measures for them to be found
constitutional. It was a minor step forward, but it showed that Holmes was beginning to have some
influence in changing the opinions of the men on the Court.
For every small victory, there was another defeat. Holmes was back in his familiar role as the
dissenter in the 1923 case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital case. S2 This case raised the question of
whether Congress had the right to establish a minimum-wage law. Not surprisingly, the majority
again relied on the "liberty of contract" doctrine to invalidate the law.
Holmes wrote a stinging dissent in which he cautioned that it was not the Justices' role to
decide cases on the basis of whether they agreed with the social or economic policy. This was a
corrunon theme but one from which Holmes never wavered. He also questioned the constitutionality
of the "liberty of contract" doctrine that the majority had so often used. Holmes went to great lengths
"'Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908).
"Bunting v Oregon, 243 US. 426 (1917)
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 US. 525 (1923).
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to show that contracts were "no more exempt from the law than other acts, ,"j He explained how the
Supreme Court had regulated contracts in the past and thus "liberty of contract" was an arbitrary
standard. He was referring to the Muller case and the Bunting case in which the COllrt had carved
out exceptions to the "liberty of contract" doctrine. The Court was now relying on a set of
precedents that were no longer absolute. Holmes completed the dissent by again questioning the
majority's role in invalidating legislation. Holmes directed his opinion straight to this point "To me
notwithstanding the deference due to the prevailing judgement of the Court, the power of the
Congress seems absolutely free from doubt. The end, to remove conditions leading to ill health,
immorality and the deterioration of the race, no one would deny to be within the scope of
Constitutional legislation. 0I54 As the opinion said, the only thing that the Court had to rule on whether
the Congress had the power to enact such legislation. The Court had no reason to look at the means
with which the legislature acted; they only had to agree that the end in question was under the
authority of the legislature.
The Adkins dissent was of historical importance for a number of reasons. When the Court
started to shift toward Holmes' jurisprudence, it would be the overruling of Adkins in the 1937 case
of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish that would signal the completion of the shift. Also, the Adkins
dissent laid out in great detail the argument against laissez-faire constitutionalism. By establishing
a step-by-step process by which Adkins could be reargued and over-turned, Holmes took his dissent
a step further than anyone previously written. Holmes did his own research and cited several foreign
53Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 US 525 (1923).
54Ibid.
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and national government precedents to validate the law, 55 Holmes had succeeded in writing a dissent
that foreshadowed the impending doom of substantive due process,
In the late 1920's Holmes was nearing the end afhis working career and needed a supporter
on the Court who could continue the fight he had started. He found this ally in Harlan Fisk Stone.
Stone had joined Holmes in several dissents, including the Adkins case. The two again were found
dissenting in the 1927 case of Tyson Brothers v. Banton. 56 Holmes wrote the dissent expressing his
view that the majority was in error by invalidating a state law. The case dealt with the ability afthe
state to enact legislation that was aimed at protecting theater goers from the inflated prices of licensed
ticket sellers. The majority again found that the state law was unconstitutional because it infringed
upon the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the ticket scalpers. Holmes made the issue in question and
the reason for dissent very clear. He stated, "I think the proper course is to recognize that a state
legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless prohibited in the Constitution of the United
States."57 The simplicity and dryness of this statement showed that Holmes wanted there to be no
mistaking how he felt on the issue, The legislature had the general right to regulate private businesses
whenever it thought the public welfare was at stake. The dissent in Tyson Brothers had a different
tone than some of his more eloquent and fluid decisions. Holmes was no longer trying to make a
profound statement on the future ofthe law; instead, he was only trying to change the way the Court
was presently going.
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 US. 525 (1923)
''Tyson Brothers v. Banton, 273 U.S 445-447 (1927).
57Ibid,
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Justice Holmes never wavered from his constitutional beliefs. Despite his dislike of dissents,
Holmes \VTote repeatedly against the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down social
experimentation. Holmes' view that the Court was not to stand as an obstacle to the legislatures'
attempts to enact social reform never changed. He was not a social reformer in the mold of some of
his liberal colleagues. Because afhis adherence to judicial restraint, Holmes asserted that the federal
judiciary should not decide cases based on whether or not they agreed with the legislative policies.
He advocated a limited federal judiciary that decided cases upon the power of the state legislatures
to enact such measures, If state legislatures wanted to try their hand at social legislation, and the
people were willing to go along with them, the Supreme Court was not the one to tell them that their
policy was not wise. The dissents, as used by Holmes, became a powerful force that was beginning
to have an impact on how the Court was deciding cases.
The legitimacy was granted to the entire line of Holmes' dissents four years after his 1932
retirement. In the famed 1937 case ofWest Coast Hotel ¥s. Parrish, the "liberty of contract" doctrine
was put to rest. 5K The case spoke directly to the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment being used to
prevent social reform and stated that "the Constitution does not speak: of freedom of contract. "59 The
Court overruled Adkins vs Children's Hospital and adopted Holmes' idea of state supremacy and
judicial restraint. The true mark ofa great dissent is its ability to predict the future, Many ofHolmes'
dissents had done just that. He had also unknowingly opened, ever so slightly, Pandora's box. The
dissent was never to be the same and neither was the idea ofa unified court.
"West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US. 379 (1937).
"Ibid
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During the thirty-years Holmes spent on the high court, he wrote dozens of dissents. His
dissents against the substantive-clue-process doctrine are among the most often quoted. In another
area, Holmes wrote a dissent that became one of the most famous pieces ofwriting on the issue of
free speech. This exemplary defense offree speech is a perfect example of the power that can be put
behind a dissent. It is also a silencer to the critics that say dissents take away from the law. Holmes'
dissent in the case ofAbrams v. U.S. has been called "the most eloquent and moving defense of free
speech since Milton's Aeropagitica. ,,60
The Abrams case arose during the difficult times of the First World War. The Espionage and
Sedition Act of 1918 made it a crime to utter, print, v.rite, or publish any material that was deemed
to be disloyal to the government of the United States. Abrams was a Russian immigrant and
anarchist. He and a co-defendant distributed two leaflets by throwing them out of a New York City
window. The pamphlets urged a general strike in protest of the war. Justice John H. Clarke wrote
for a 7-2 majority and upheld the lower court's conviction of these two men under the Sedition Act.
Clarke wrote that these pamphlets presented a danger to the United States because of their being
distributed at the supreme crisis of the war.61
Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion that did a great deal to influence how the
Court has ever-since interpreted free speech. Just a few weeks prior to the Abrams dissent, Holmes
had written the majority opinion in a case that upheld a conviction under the Espionage and Sedition
"'Kennit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, Paul Finkelman, American Legal History: Cases
and Materials (New York: Oxford University Press. 1991),416.
"Abrams et al v. United States, 250 US. 616 (1919).
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Act In the 1919 case of Schenck v. U. S" Holmes established that the constitutional right to free
speech did not reach so far as to allow all speech at all times, In his opinion Holmes set forth the test
that would become the standard by which free speech is judged. He wrote: "The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."62 The "clear and present danger" test has dominated the Court's rulings on free speech ever
smce, In the wake of this majority opinion, Holmes' dissent in Abrams seemed a quick change of
heart. On the contrary, the Court had simply interpreted the test laid out by Holmes in a more rigid
fashion than he had intended. Holmes wrote that the leaflets which the men were convicted for
publishing were not prohibited by the Sedition Act. Holmes did not back down from his Schenck
opinion; he simply applied a different set of circumstances to the same test and found a different
result. In the dissenting opinion Holmes stated that it is better to allow freedom to reign supreme
than to prohibit ideas and thus coerce people into thinking in a particular way.63
Holmes outlined the famous framework of the clear-and-present danger test in his opinion.
It basically stated that speech should be allowed unless it produces or is intended to produce a clear
and present danger. The First Amendment and free speech are crucial to maintaining a democracy;
Holmes felt the Court was out of line in deeming this type of speech to be a crime, Holmes
completed the dissent with another example of his reluctance to dissents: "1 regret that 1 cannot put
into more impressive words my belief that the defendants were deprived of their rights under the
"Abrams, et al v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
63Ibid,
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Constitution. '164
Dubbed by many as the greatest American legal thinker, Justice Holmes set in motion a trend
that continues today. Holmes was able to bring ahout a great change with his dissents. He was never
viewed as a loner or a thorn in the side ofprogress. Instead, Holmes used the dissent to speak out
against a formalist approach to judging. He also was able to make the dissenting opinion a powerful
method ofchanging the law. It should come as no surprise that many judges looked to the legacy left
by Holmes and tried to emulate his success. The dissent was his method of changing the law, and it
would also soon be the weapon ofchoice for many judges that followed.
The first few years after Holmes' resignation did not see a great increase in the number of
dissents. ChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes was able to maintain the illusion of solidarity, or at least
to discourage individual expression. From the 1933 term to the 1940 term, there was at least one
dissenting opinion in only 14.25% of the cases per year.65 This was about to be drastically altered.
In 1941, the Court saw two big changes. First, Harlan Fisk Stone was sworn in as Chief
Justice. Second, the dissent rate jumped to a record high of29.1%. This was nearly double the
average and served notice that the use of the dissenting opinion had changed. The 1941 dissent rate
of 29% was not a one-year occurrence. [n the years that followed, the dissent rate never again
dropped below 40%.66
There is no single answer as to why this shift occurred. As with so many historical changes,
"Abrams, et a1 v. United States, 250 US. 616 (1919).
65Appendix, table 3-2.
66Ibid.
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the shift did not occur overnight. The best place to begin the explanation is with the new Chief
Justice, Harlan F. Stone, From Stone's earliest days on the Court, he and Holmes viewed many issues
in identical fashion. The phrase "Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone dissenting" was common beginning
in 1925. Although Justice Louis Brandeis was a frequent dissenter and had a significant influence on
the Court and the law, his impact on the overall method in which dissents are used has not been as
pronounced as that ofeither Holmes or Stone. All three men are widely remembered for their dissent
writing and all three had an impact on how it was used. Justice Stone was able to have the most
effect on the use the dissent when he was appointed to the position ofChiefJustice.
It is fitting that on January 12, 1932, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rode down from his ~
position on the Supreme Court with Justice Stone. Chief Justice Hughes had accepted Holmes'
resignation the day before, and it would be his companion Stone who would carry on the legacy of
"The Great Dissenter," Stone and Holmes always had the greatest respect for each other. Stone
came to the Court in the later years ofHolmes' service, yet they held many of the same views. On
the divisive issue ofusing the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state laws, the two jurists stood
side by side. Both jurists were finn believers in judicial restraint and in expressing dissent when the
Court attempted to step into the jurisdiction ofthe legislature. The names of Holmes and Stone were
found together in the dissent fifteen times on this issue alone.61 After Holmes stepped down from his
position on the bench, Stone referred to him as "one of the greatest men who ever sat upon (the
Supreme Court), and one of the greatest men and most beautiful characters it has been my privilege
67Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (London: Oxford
University Press 1938), 122-131.
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to know. ,,68
The praise for Holmes was not reserved for a special salutary address. Stone time and again
spoke of the Holmes tradition and the great understanding of the law that he felt Holmes possessed. 69
Stone's New England upbringing did not make him one to pour praise on those around him, but this
did not hold him back from making his true feelings for Holmes known. On Holmes' ninetieth
birthday Stone 'Wrote, "You are a constant inspiration to me. When the task seems irksome and my
best efforts futile, I recall the serenity with which yOll meet each day.... So I send myself to the task
with renewed confidence, even though I know my best will never equal your worst. 'o1O The praise
stemmed from the greatness of Holmes and the common threads that ran through both men. This
commonality was most present in their views and jurisprudence as judges.
In a letter to Hohnes, commenting on a decision, Stone wrote, "We are so seldom on opposite
sides of the fence."l1 Both men had many of the same views about things from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the issue ofjudicial restraint. Their common views were most recognizable in the
divisive issue of the power ofthe state legislatures to enact social regulations. Both saw the need for
the Court to allow these legislatures to have the freedom to enact measures that they saw fit as long
as they were using the enumerated power granted them under the Constitution. This included not
using the phrases such as "liberty ofcontract" and "police power" to find these laws unconstitutional.
68Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York: Viking Press
1956),325.
"Ibid., 327.
7°Ibid.
71Ibid.,328.
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The duty of the Court to use restraint was paramount to both men when it came to finding laws
unconstitutional. The men agreed the states had the power to experiment. Holmes said, "They can't
do it, but let them try." Stone's remark was basically the same as his elder colleague's, "They should
not do it, but judges are not the ones to oppose. "n
lbroughout the fight against substantive due process, Holmes and Stone saw things in similar
light most afthe time. They were both defenders of the right of states to enact legislation. From the
early days with Holmes, Stone became a frequent dissenter. Most Supreme Court Justices had been
conditioned in the "no dissent unless absolutely unavoidable" mentality_ Because ofhis connection
with Holmes, Stone was,never conditioned in this manner. Stone's own view of the dissent was even
more open than Holmes', Whereas Holmes dissented only when he had no choice and even then
often apologized for the dissent, Stone had no such qualms about expressing his personal views.
Stone said the dissent's real influence is "often in shaping and sometimes in altering the course of the
laW."73 He had seen the dissent have this effect and was ready to put it to the test whenever he felt
the majority had erred.
Many of Stone's dissents eventually became adopted by the majority. For this and several
other reasons, Stone was a staunch supporter of the dissent and ajudge1s right to do so whenever
necessary, In a speech to a group offederal judges, Stone chose as his topic: "Dissenting Opinions
are Not Without Value. ,,74 In the address Stone said, "a considered and well-stated dissent sounds
72Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone, 322.
73Stone, "Dissenting Opinions, II 78.
74Stone, "Dissenting Opinions," 78.
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a warning note that legal doctrines are not to be pressed too far. It sometimes arrests a trend and
sometimes reverses it." 75 In 1937 with West Coast Hotel, Stone had seen the offensive "liberty of
contract" trend arrested and indeed knew the dissent was to be thanked. This experience made Stone
a prolific dissenter, and not one to discourage others from doing the same.
In 1941 Stone was sworn in as ChiefJustice ofthe Supreme Court. It was in this position that
he would have his greatest impact on the method of decision writing by the Supreme Court. Stone
was elevated to the position after sixteen years as an Associate Justice. The Chief Justice whom
Stone first served under was William Howard Taft. Taft came to the Court after a highly successful
political career that included a term as President of the United States. Taft used his great political
skill to keep team spirit on the Court.15 There is little question that he resented dissents. Taft not
only refrained from dissenting, but he also greatly discouraged the Associate Justices from showing
signs ofdivision. During Taft's years in the Chief Justice position, he dissented in only sixteen cases
out of over] 700. By rarely dissenting, Taft was in position to influence the lower members of the
Court to adopt his anti-dissent approach to decision writing. In an analysis of the Supreme Court
Chief Justices, David Danelski concluded that Taft "socialized new justices in the no dissent
tradition. ,m He had the least amount ofsuccess with Justice Stone. In a letter to Stone, Taft wrote,
"Dissents seldom aid in the right development ofthe law. They often do harm. For myself! say: lead
15Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Walker, "The Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms, II 387.
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us not into temptation.,,78
After Taft stepped down in 1930, Charles Evans Hughes became Chief Justice. Hughes was
from the same judicial mold as his predecessor, He was highly effective at keeping the members of
the Court from dissenting. Owen Roberts wrote that Hughes' leadership resulted in a "feeling of
personal cordiality and comradeship that ... was unique in a Court so seriously divided in its review
on great matters. 1179 Hughes and Taft shared the "no dissent unless absolutely necessary tradition. "so
Hughes was detennined to present the Court to the public as a united body. He held that dissenting
showed a judicial division that was not good for public confidence in the Court. Hughes once wrote
to Stone about a decision he did not like but was supporting, "I choke a little at swallowing your
analysis, still] do not think it would serve any useful purpose to expose my views...81 This was an
attempt to show Stone that one should not always dissent despite disagreements. The statement
showed Hughes' view on the dissent but had little effect on Stone.
Despite this admonishment, Stone was a frequent dissenter. During six different terms Stone
wrote more dissenting opinions than any other Justice. 82 ]n 1941 Stone was elevated to the position
ofChiefJustice of the Supreme Court, and in this position his view of the dissent and its place in the
decisions of the Court did not change. Stone frequently dissented even as ChiefJustice; this left him
nWalker, "The Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms, " 382.
"Ibid 38\.,
"Ibid., 380.
"Ibid., 381.
"Ibid 383.,
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in no position to discourage other Justices from expressing their views. The philosophy Stone held
about dissenting opinions sharply contrasted that of the earlier ChiefJustices. Stone did not believe
that it was the ChiefJustices duty to suppress the other Justices views. In response to an anonymous
New York Herald Tribune letter that questioned the Court and the Chief Justice's "growing tendency
to disagree, ,,83 Stone wrote, "The right to dissent is an important one and has proved to be such in
the history of the Supreme Court. I do not think: it is the appropriate function of the Chief Justice to
attempt to dissuade members of the Court from dissenting in individual cases. "M
With the Chief Justice expressing views of this nature, the Associates now had free reign to
individual expression. While the Court1s membership did not change in the early days of Stone's
leadership, the way the Justices voted did change. In 1942, the first term of Stone's Chief Justiceship,
the percentage of cases with at least one dissenting opinion jumped to 29.1 %. The following year
it went up to 42.9%, and in Stones's third term it crossed the fifty-percent mark at 52.3%.85 These
high numbers were in sharp contrast to the Court's previous norm of 14%. These new numbers
proved not to be a reaction to the appointment of a new Chief Justice. The high number of the first
term proved to be lower than that of any other one term since. The Justices had been given the
freedom to do what Justice Douglas had called "the only thing that made the job of an appellate judge
bearable. ,,86 The firm belief in unanimity had changed, and the dissent was now accepted.
83Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone, 607.
84Ibid., 608.
85Appendix, table 3-2.
"Barth, Prophets with Honor, 28.
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Stone was at the head ofthe Court and was leading it into a trend of more dissenting opinions
than any other Court before them. All of the sitting members of the Court had read and studied the
great dissents of Justice Holmes, and many of those had indeed already become famous for their
foresight. The men that were now sitting under Chief Justice Stone had been given full permission
to try their hands at predicting the course of the law. This proved to be a temptation that few were
willing to resist. As one final example of Stone's full acceptance of dissents, he spoke of the recent
criticisms ofthe Court under his rule, and responded by saying that the only problem he saw was too
many separate concurrences, 87
On April 22, 1946, Justice Stone was struck with a cerebral hemorrhage and died later that
day. It is only fitting that Stone had in his hand an opinion that he was about to read before the
Court. The opinion was a dissent. It was a sudden but fitting end to an extremely short tenure of five
years as ChiefJustice. During this brief time, Stone managed to change the way in which decisions
were written. Stone made it a priority to ensure that all of the Justices were given the freedom to
write a separate opinion whenever they felt their consciences demanded such action. As Chief
Justice, he opened the door for many subsequent generations ofjudges to have all the freedom that
he saw as a self-imposed check on the power of the majority. The role of the Chief Justice was
transfonned under the leadership of Stone. The Chief Justice was no longer expected to refrain from
dissenting, nor was the Chief Justice to discourage dissents from his or her fellow members of the
bench. Stone did not serve long, but his legacy of a Court free to dissent continues.
The use of dissents that began during Stone's brief tenure as Chief Justice soon established
87Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone, 609.
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itself as a trend that was not going to change. Chief Justice Fred Vinson succeeded Stone in 1946,
and it was immediately apparent that there was going to be no greater degree of harmony under his
leadership than there was under his predecessor, In his first term, the rate of dissents actually jumped
to 64%.88 The dissent had proven itself to be a strong force that could alter the law. The task of
trying to revert back to the days ofunity proved to be futile, In the first five years after Stone, the
dissent rate remained high. In 1951 the rate of cases in which there was at least one dissenting
opinion stood at an all-time high of 83%.89 The standard had been firmly established that when a
Justice wished to express disagreement \Vith the Court, he or she had free rein to do so,
Today's Supreme Court has shown an equal willingness to use the dissent. Over the last five
years, there has been at least one dissent in over 50% of all cases decided. 90 Many of the criticisms
that have been directed at the dissent over time have proven to be somewhat true. One of the points
generally made by the defenders of unity on the Court has always been that publicly expressed
division would cause Iustices to be unwilling to agree with each other when prudence would call for
such an action.
In particular the vehement dissents of Justice Antonin Scalia have caused many to question
the useful effect of the dissent. In the 1996 decision on the rights of women to attend the state-
supported Virginia Military Institute, Scalia's lone dissent brought a flow of criticism. The 7-1
majority held that a woman's equal protection rights were violated when she was denied entrance
HHCarp, Judicial Process in America, 345-350.
"Ibid., 350.
90Ibid.
40
II
,
I
~
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
strictly because ofgender. Scalia lashed out at the majority claiming their equal protection analysis
was irresponsible. His strong words were directed at Chief Justice Rehnquist. Scalia asserted that
any lawyer giving the advice that Rehnquist did should "have either been disbarred or committed. ,,91
This was the first time in memory that an Associate had called for the ChiefJustice's commitment to
a non-legal institution. These stinging remarks seemed a prime example of the dissent used at its
worst. Scalia was not only a lone voice crying against the voice of reason; but, he was also showing
disrespect for the most senior member ofthe Court. If Scalia's object was to show that when a good
thing is taken to its ultimate extreme, it too can become a detriment to the Court, then he
accomplished this goal on all counts. Such disregard for civility has caused Scalia to receive much
criticism, and in the process so has the dissent.
In a similar case, Scalia used a separate opinion in the form of a concurrence to show his
willingness to attack his colleagues. The 1988 case ofWebster v. Reproductive Health Services re-
examined the right to abortion. The majority opinion accepted substantially more restrictive
regulations on the rights of a woman to have an abortion than had previously been deemed
acceptable. The decision, however, did not go so far as to overrule the Roe holding that abortions
are upheld as part of the rights protected by the Constitution. This point was where Scalia attacked.
In the concurrence, Scalia Mote that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion "could not be taken
seriously. ,192 A fanner Scalia clerk said that he "completely alienated O'Connor and lost her
"United States v. Virginia et al. 116 US. 694 (1996)
"Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 492 US 490 (1989).
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forever."93 The long-noted fear ofthe separate opinion being used in such a way as to cause divisions
among members of the Court had come true.
Although the dissent has received strong criticism, it remains a valuable tool for Justices to
shape the law. Former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo once wrote: "The voice of the
majority may be that of force triumphant, content with the plaudits of the hour and reeking little of
the morrow. The dissenter speaks of the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that will carry
through the years ... 94 There have been many times in the Court's history in which this was the role
played by the dissents. Despite its sometimes exaggerated use, the good it can bring about is worth
the wrong into which it seldom falls.
The ability ofthe judge that disagrees with the majority to voice his or her opinion has always
been a part of the American court system. Justice Holmes used this outlet to its fullest potential.
With his many forceful dissents, Justice Holmes was able to change the law when the majority had
fallen down on its job of properly interpreting the Constitution. In particular, Holmes' dissenting
battle against substantive due process proved that the right to dissent was one that should forever
remain available to all judges.
During the difficult times in which ChiefJustice Stone presided over the Court, a new sense
offreedom was introduced to all Associate Justices. Stone never saw his job as one that required him
to impose unanimity. Stone challenged the Court frequently and thus showed the other Justices that
93David 1. Garrow, "The Rehnquist Reins," The New York Times Magazine, (Oct. 6,
1996),68-69.
94Jackson, Dissent in the Supreme Court, ]7.
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dissenting opinions were perfectly permissible. He had seen the dissent change the law when he
dissented with Holmes and was a stem advocate for the other Justices to have that same opportunity.
Stone's biographer put it best when he said: "He might seek unanimity by removing doubts and
misunderstandings so far as that could be accomplished by exposition and discussion at conference.
But unanimity purchased at the cost, either for himselfor others, of strongly held convictions was not
worth the price."95 In a final example ofStoneIS belief in the power and beauty of the dissent, he once
wrote to a friend: "In the history of Constitutional interpretation dissenting opinions have often
ultimately become the law ofthe Court, and in other instances have served as a check upon doctrines
adopted by the Court."% Stone not only believed in the sanctity of the dissent, but he also opened
the door for all to use it for the betterment of the Court and country.
There is little question that the dissent has been able to stand up to all of the criticism that has
come its way. In many ofthe most heated legal debates, a dissent has been the voice of principle that
helped the Court correct a temporary wrong. From Justice Harlan's prophetic 1896 dissent against
the doctrine ofseparate but equal in PlesS)' v. Ferguson, to the ill-received dissent ofJustice Antonin
Scalia in the U.S. v Virginia case in 1996, the dissent has insured that every decision of the all-
powerful Supreme Court has been properly considered. Not only have cases been properly
considered, but the opposition has had a voice, a voice which has been reported alongside the official
holding. The strength of the dissent is that no matter the influence ofany political faction or over-
bearing ChiefJustice, there is always a podium from which any Justice can deliver his or her message.
95Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone, 575.
"Ibid.
Justice Scalia addressed a meeting of the Supreme Court History Society in 1994. The title of his
address was simply "The Dissenting Opinion." He said: "By enabling, indeed compelling, the Justices
ofthe Supreme Court, through their personally signed majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions,
to set forth clear and consistent positions on both sides of the major legal issues of the day, it has kept
the Court in the forefront of the intellectual development of the law. 1197 Even if such freedom only
accomplished halfof this task, it would be invaluable in improving the Court and therefore the nation
as a whole.
To conclude an assessment ofthe dissent without once more remembering the words of "The
Great Dissenter" himselfwould involve slighting a Justice that helped frame how all judges look at
cases. The words ofJustice Holmes' famous dissent on free speech apply as much to members of the
Supreme Court as they do to average citizens on the street. He \¥fote: ''The ultimate good desired
is better reached by a free trade in ideas--that the best test oftruth is the power of thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment,H98 [fthe experiment were to see if the dissent could be
used as a measure to forever insure the status of the Court, it was successful.
91Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," 39.
'"Abrams et 81. v. US , 250 US. 616, 630 (1919).
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Appendix
Opinion. Decision, ood Outcome Trends 149
Table 3·2 Dissenting Opinions, 1800-1991 Terms
t:lortiOll of Pruportion of
ses that Number of cases cases with
unaninwus WIth dissenting Total number at least one
.369
Term" opinions of cases b dissmting opinion <
.374 1800 0 0 .000
.344 1801 0 • .000
.367 1803 0 II .000
.281 1804 0 15 .000
;: '
.318 1805 1 10 .100
.381 1806 0 17 .000
.391 1807 0 10 .000
343 1808 • 21 .190
.341 1809 • 37 .108
.381 1810 1 27 .037
.277 1812 1 31 ,032
.352 1813 3
"
077
.365 1814 5
"
.109
.400 1815 2 39 .051
.•58 1816 3 .0 .075
.444 1817 1 40 .025
.333 1818 2 3. .056
.314 1819 0 32 .000
.444 1820 3 26 .115
.421 1821 1 33 .030
.336 1822 1 29 .034
.395 1823 2 27 ,074
.394 1824 • 39 .1031825 0 27 .000
; and orilly 1826 0 29 .000
only. 1827 1 45 .022
C. Herman 1828 3 53 .057
1931·1934; 1829 2 .2 .048145-1952: C. 1830 7 51 .137icago Press. 1831 7 .0 .175l citation as
1: Albert P. 1832 5 50 .100
:;hoe String 1833 2 38 .053
rkload of the 1834 2 59 .034
,. Supreme 1835 3 38 .079
1836 1 48 .021
1837 5 19 .263
1838 5 40 .125
1839 5 51 .098
1840 3 41 .073
1841 0 31 .000
1842 2 42 .048
1843 4 2. .154
1844 3 39 .077
(Table continues)
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Table 3-2 (Continued) Table 3-2 (Confinued)
Proportion of l'roportion '
Number of cases cases with Number of cases cases willi
with dissenting Total number at least one wilh diS5cnting Total 11Imrllcr
at least on
Term" opinions ()f cases b dissenting opinicmc _ Term" opinions of cll~es b
disswtilrg opil
•
1845 13 49 .265 1890 I' 297 .047
1846 2 46 .043 1891 20
252 ,liS
1847 5 35 .143 1892 22 231
.095
1848 3 35 .086 1893 23
280 .082
1849 8 .0 .200 1894 23 225
.102
1850 25 15' .160 1895 25 257
.097
1851 10 94 .106 1896 12 22R
.053
1852 12 53 .226 1897 16 1R4
.087
1853 16 80 .200 1898 14 173
.081
1854 15 71 .211 1899 15 21'
.070
1855 14 90 .156 1900 22 197
.112
1856 8 63 .127 1901 12 179
.067
1857 9 70 .129 1902 18 213
.085
1858 6 69 .087 1903 20 208
.096
1859 • 115
.035 1904 17 194 .088
1860 3 .. .047 1905 22 168
.131
1861 2 74 .027 190' 12 20S
.059
1862 7 41 .171 1907 15 176
.085
1863 • 75
.053 1908 14 181 .077
1864 5 55 .091 1909 9 175
.051
1865 7 70 .100 1910 13 16H
.077
1866 6 128 .047 1911 9 230
.039
1867 7 96 .073 1912 10 271
.037
1868 13 11' .114 1913 5 285
.018
1869 14 169 .083 1914 16 257
.062
1870 15 151 .099 1915 5 235
.021
1871 21 148 .142 1916 16 207
.077
1872 23 157 .146 1917 13 208
.062
1873 21 193 .109 1918 14 213
.066
1874 17 186 .091 1919 23 168
.137
1875 23 200 .115 1920 16 217
.074
1876 16 219 .073 1921 24 I71
.140
1877 21 248 .085 1922 15 223
.067
1878 23 198 .116 1923 12 212
.057
1879 18 205 .088 , 1924 10 232
.043
1880 9 221 .041 !' 1925 12 210
.057
1881 II 232 .047 !i 1926 24 199 .121
1882 I7 267 .064 . (1: 1927 32 175
.183
1883 14 277 .051 .~ 1928 14 129 .109
1884 II 271 .041 .!'lo 1929 14 13•
.104
1885 18 '80 .064 ): 1930 13 166
.078
1886 12 298 .040 ': 1931 16 150
.107
1887 13 287 .045 ": 1932 17 168
.101
1888 6 242 .025 ) (Tab//' con.
1889 16 282 .057
,
.J
~,
--_.....~---.- _..~_._------
Table 3-2 (Contblued)
Proportion of
Number of cases cases with
with dissenting Tutal number III least one
Tirm' opinions of cases b dissenting apiniol
---.
1978 B3 134 .619
1979 105 141
.745
1980 83 128 .648
1981 94 148
.635
1982 94 155
.6061983 85 155
.5481984 79 142
.556
1985 101 153
.6601986 106 153
.6931987 80 144
.5561988 84 140
.6001989 84 131
.6411990 70 114 .6141991 65 109 596
'Court did not meet during 1802 or 1811.
bFor 1953-1991, to!JI number of cases inrludes those with signed opinions and oral!
argued per curiJms; for earlier terms, indudl's signed opinion.~ of the Court only.
oDue to Jmbiguity in the description of data prior to the 1953 term, we cannot determin
whether data represent the number of dissenting opinions or the number of cases witl
dissenting opinions. Hl'nce, the proportion may no! be comparable across all terms.
Sources: Number of dis~ntingopinions, 1800-1952: Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky
The FiN;1 Glle Hlmdred Justices (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe Siring Pre.",~, 1978). 137-140; 1953-199,
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database. with orally argul.'d citation as unl! of analysis. Tota
number of cases and propurtions therefrom, 1800-1926: Albert P. Blaustl.'in and Roy M
Mersky, Tlte First Glle Hlmdred Tustin!" (Hamden, Conn,: Shoe String Pres:;. 197B), 137.140
1927-1952: Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, The WorklOlld of Ihe Supreme Cour
(Chicago: American Dar Foundation. 1976), 76; 1953-1991: U.S. Supreme Court Judicia
Database, with cila!ion as unit of analysi.~_
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, Thoma
G. Walker, The Supr~lle Court Compendium: Data, De
isions a'!..d__ --oevelopments. (WaHhlngton,- D.C.: Cong
;ressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), 149~153.
- ~--_.
